

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000300020006-2 1954
NSC BRIEFING

PERFORMANCE ESTIMATE FOR SOVIET JET HEAVY BOMBER
25X1X7

25X1X7

I. [REDACTED] estimates of performance as of 1957 for the

Soviet [REDACTED] Heavy Jet Bomber have been finalized. For

25X1C

25X1D

comparative purposes, [REDACTED]

25X1X7

[REDACTED] estimates are herein presented.

25X1X7

25X1C

Take off weight
(pounds)
Bomb load
(pounds)*
Combat radius
(N miles)
Combat range
(N miles)
Target altitude
(feet)
Maximum targets
speed (knots)

Optimum Radius/Range
Mission

345,000

10,000

2,600

5,100

43,700

487

USAF Declass/Release Instructions On File

II. Estimated optimum mission performances with 10,000 lb.

bomb loads (multi-megaton weapons) are such that without

utilizing forward staging bases (Chukotski) and range

extension techniques e.g. in-flight refueling or one-way

25X1D

missions, the [REDACTED] represents a striking power still

generally oriented toward Europe, Asia, and peripheral

areas. Thus, the full measure of threat posed by the

Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000300020006-2 - -
See Background - "Bomb Load Variations"

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED] depends upon

25X1D a. an as yet undemonstrated in-flight refueling capability requiring 18 months to 2 years to develop and

25X1D b. a Soviet decision to expend in 1957 all 50 estimated operational [REDACTED] aircraft on missions with the expectation that only half might reach assigned targets.

III. In the aggregate, the mid-1957 picture would appear to be

one in which the TU-4 would still figure prominently,

25X1D with the [REDACTED] a strong element of strength against

25X1D Eurasian and peripheral targets, and [REDACTED] just

coming into significant quantity. Given Soviet nuclear

capabilities, this is a serious and formidable picture,

but it is not particularly alarming with respect to the

25X1D continental US. However, with series [REDACTED] production,

operational staging bases, and an effective in-flight

refueling system, the threat increases sharply becoming

~~TOP SECRET~~

Background

BOMB LOAD VARIATIONS

25X1D By decreasing the bomb load from ten thousand to three thousand pounds and increasing the fuel load accordingly, the combat radius/range of [REDACTED] may be extended slightly. However, nuclear ordnance weighing 3,000 lb. would be a marginally acceptable strategic weapon. If effectively constructed, a 3,000 lb. weapon could yield an energy equivalent of approximately 20KT--the yield of the Nagasaki bomb. By extravagant, inefficient use of nuclear material this yield could be boosted. Such uneconomical use of nuclear material appears unlikely as the Soviet stockpile of nuclear material in 1957 will still be relatively modest.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000300020006-2

Background

Comparison of the Basic Missions of [REDACTED] and US B-52

25X1D

US B-52

25X1X7

Take off weight
(pounds)

345,000

390,000

25X1C

Bomb load
(pounds)

10,000

10,000

Combat radius
(NM)

2,350

3,160

Combat range
(NM)

4,360

6,560

Target altitude
(feet)

41,200

46,700

Maximum Target
speed (knots)

492

480

Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000300020006-2

~~SECRET~~

